Personal tools for learning are everywhere. We have mobile phones,
tablets, and many of us use social media to keep abreast of and contribute to
domains of knowledge which interest us. Institutional champions of social
software and personal technology continue to encourage greater integration
between personal tools and formal learning (sometimes under the banner of the
‘Personal Learning Environment’), or to encourage greater ‘literacy’ about
technology, but the precise nature of this advocacy is unclear: it is clearly not
that learners do not use the internet, smart phones or social software; it is rather
that there is a gap in the purpose and nature of the interactions and
expectations which occur between what is recognised as formal learning and what
occurs informally. Part of this gap concerns the nature of the transactions
that occur between learners and institutions, and between learners and
technology corporations. In formal education the transaction typically concerns
the completing assignments in exchange for grades from a tutor, and a
certificate at the end of a course. With personal tools and social media, the
learner consciously participates in transactions with friends and others,
whilst (perhaps less consciously) engaging in a transaction with the social
media corporations who provide the means of communication and who, in return,
target advertising. Both educational establishments and technology corporations
are institutions, and with both there is a pattern of transactional engagement.
The relationship between the Personal Learning Environment and
institutions is poorly inspected: rhetoric which overstated the case for
de-institutionalising educational technology took a simplistic view of both
institutions and technology. Technology was seen as a counter-institutional
force in education which could overcome barriers to learning created by rigid
institutions. Originally conceived as a critique of the explosion of technology
in formal education, the PLE argued that many institutional learning
technologies became barriers to learning rather than enablers: each new tool
provided new interfaces, often new passwords, new functionality and so on, and
in order to proceed with their learning, learners had to negotiate increasing
technological complexity. The argument was to shift the locus of control of
technology towards the learner: wouldn’t it be better if different services
from different sources (for example, communications services from different
providers) could be integrated by learners, and the barriers of different
interfaces addressed by having standard approaches for integrating and managing
services? Students should be able to bring their own tools to their learning. Over
the years, many aspects of this technological argument have been vindicated by
technical developments. Mobile platforms now feature service integration:
messaging tools, calendaring tools, media services and other facilities are
today on most mobile platforms provider-neutral. Moreover, the adding of new
services has, in the way that was reflected in PLE prototype tools like PLEX,
become a standardised and easy process – often involving little more than
installing an App. Appstores themselves have simplified the processes of
coordinating and increasing the number of services individuals can coordinate.
And perhaps most importantly, educational institutions have made their
technologies available as Apps which can be more easily coordinated with other
social media tools. The arguments about standardised technological coordination
have largely been seen to be correct.
Before 2005 and the social software explosion, the argument that social
technology was counter-institutional was clearer than it appears today.
Experiments in peer-to-peer learning technologies like Colloquia (a server-less
VLE) certainly provided opportunities for learners to take control of their
technologies, allowing them to self-organise by creating their own courses,
establish private groups and coordinate their own tools either with or without
a teacher. However, with the advent of centralised social media which exploited
Service-Oriented architectures to drive technological flexibility, the powerful
affordances of these technologies gained mass following and approval by
promoters of the PLE. Where peer-to-peer technologies like Colloquia had no
owner, Facebook and Twitter were corporations. This meant that the distinction
between a counter-institutional technology and the institutional rigidity of
universities became a murkier battle where distinctions were harder to draw.
For this reason, the question about institutions is at the heart of the
PLE where once there was a question about technology. Here there are two
aspects to the question. On the one hand, there is a question about the
institution of education - how it operates, and what it achieves. On the other hand, there is now a question about the
institution of technology and the way that transactions are managed between learners and social media corporations. What is the relation
between a person and the various institutions with which they engage as they
move through the world? Institutions dominate life: the institution of
education, the institution of health, the institution of the
family, the state, public services, the media and so on. Each of these makes
demands on learners – from simple transactions for the payment of services, to
more complex transactions to uphold trust and commitments. Technologies mediates these transactions, and technologies themselves are controlled by institutions. So a clearer
definition of an institution, and particularly a clearer understanding of the
institution of technology is required.
Institutions
and the PLE
Our principal focus is the identification of the institution through the
study of transactions that individuals have with them. The philosophy of
institutions has a long history, but the institution of technology is
relatively new. It would not have occurred to Aristotle to consider those
aspects of ‘techne’ as institutional in the way that he regarded the institutions of state.
Among more recent perspectives, the view that institutions are human constructs
is common: institutions exist through their continual
reproduction and transformation by humans; if, as Bhaskar tells us, humans
cease to exist, then institutions cease to exist: they comprise what he calls
the “transitive domain of reality”. Yet this point is complex: Bhaskar argues for
the continued existence of the Sun and the stars in the event of human
annihilation – aspects of what he calls the “intransitive domain of reality”.
Upholding the reality of his "intransitive" domain, Bhaskar upholds a separation
between institutions and humans, between social structure and human agency.
This separation is controversial. Giddens also maintains a distinction
between structure and agency, but maintains that institutions do not have a
separate existence beyond human minds: institutions are constructed in
discourse. Searle more recent social ontology has developed a similar position, arguing that institutions and other
social phenomena exist by virtue of ‘declarations’ of ‘status’ and ‘function’
by powerful actors in society, and a broad acknowledgement of ‘collective
intentionality’ which upholds it. Both Giddens and Searle adhere to what Archer
calls ‘ellisionist’ philosophy in conflating mind with social structure, a more
extreme example of which is contained in the sociomaterial philosophy of
Latour, Barad or Orlikowski. Here the quantum theoretical notion of
‘entanglement’ is used to articulate the difficulties in separating
mind from nature, and in sociomaterial applications to education, technology
from learning.
Whether institutions are separable from minds or not, they clearly have
important effects. Institutions declare laws, provide healthcare, employ
people, grant degrees, make products and provide services. To consider the personal organisation of learners who revolve around institutions without inspecting the
nature of institutions themselves is to ignore half the story. To criticise
ignorance of institutions in favour of the pursuit of focus on the ends of
institutional engagement (learning), is to parallel similar criticism of
ignorance of the the institution of firms and markets in economics. Coase, for
example, believed that institutions were overlooked in economic analysis which
focused on means and ends. In Coase’s economic theory, the institution was
constituted through the transactions that individuals engage through it:
crucially, the ‘firm’ only existed because the transaction cost of dealing
directly with a market was too high. Again, similar arguments can be made for
the institution of education, and the capability of independent teachers to
obtain an income outside the institutions walls. More recently, work under the
banner of “New Institutionalism”, the nature of the transactions within the
institution has been studied more closely. DiMaggio and Powell have identified
those processes whereby the management of institutions become similar: for
example, the ways in which the management of a University becomes similar to
the management of a technology company (and thus it is not surprising to see
Martin Bean take the helm of the Open University). In terms of examining the
content of transactions between institutions, Etkowitz and Leydesdorff’s Triple
Helix presents measurable techniques based in Shannon’s Information Theory whereby
the integration between discursive transactions can provide a metric of levels
of innovation.
In the PLE, the learner engages in many transactions with many different
kinds of institution. Technology has transformed this process of transaction
management to the point that most transactions are mediated by technology.
Whilst technological barriers to managing transactions have been alleviated,
the nature of the management of transactions by learners has not been considered. Yet the
starting point for thinking about transactions is to consider that both
learners and institutions must remain viable: that the processes of
reproduction and transformation which learners (and everyone else) engages in
with institutions, the choices that learners and institutions make in their
transactions, will be determined by ways of maintaining their viability within a
complex environment. The modelling of viability of the learner played a role in
the articulation of a broader argument about the relationship between the
person, institutions and technology in the PLE (Johnson and Liber, 2008) using
a model of the ‘person as a viable system’ based on Stafford Beer’s Viable
System Model.
Revisiting
the Learner as a Viable System
The Viable System Model is a cybernetic model of the regulating
mechanisms of living systems, whether they are individual organisms or
collectives like bee-hives or businesses. Drawing on analogies with the human
body, and on the work of cyberneticians such as Ross Ashby whose ‘Design for a
Brain’ postulated the need for multiple-level regulatory mechanisms in living
things, and McCulloch’s pioneering work on neural networks and heterarchical
organisation, the VSM draws together a number of streams of thought into a
deceptively simple model which Beer used primarily as a discursive tool within
business organisations to help optimise business organisation. Beer’s
definition of cybernetics more generally was that it was the “art and science
of effective organisation”.
As a recursive model, the VSM is fractal in nature: each viable system
comprises viable systems, and each viable system is a component in a larger
viable system. Fundamentally, each viable system has to survive in its
environment, where survival means that the complexity of the environment must
either be absorbed by the system, or that the system can adapt to absorb new
complexities. The process of absorbing complexity is a process of coordinating
operations within the environment: most basically, eating, seeking food,
avoiding predators; for learners, this list can be appended with ‘getting
assignments in’, not running out of money, returning library books,
socialising, career planning, and so on. This coordination requires a
metasystem which has oversight of the basic operations, and which can provision
resources so that the individual operations work effectively. Within the
metasystem, there are specific functions. Operations have to be coordinated in
such a way that they do not conflict with each other – in education, the
timetable does this; operations have to be adequately resourced and directed –
in education, ensuring access to adequate information is essential; the
effectiveness of the coordination needs to be checked – getting feedback on
performance is essential if learners are to know how they are progressing;
potential threats in the environment need to be scanned and processes of
adaptation or appropriate response coordinated – in education, the changing job
market may require new kinds of activities; and the conflicting balance between
the disruption of adaptation and the ongoing requirement for operational
management has to be monitored – learners have to establish an identity which gives
them sufficient flexibility to adapt to different situations, but which ensures
that effective organisation of fundamental operations is maintained.
Whilst the VSM is a powerful metaphor, its utilisation requires some
care. Beer makes no claim for the ontological existence of his regulating
systems: there is no real System 2 or 3 - the VSM is a tool to think with.
Related to this is the fact that the regulating systems are conceived as
constructs emerging from discourse. Beer illustrates the differences between
the regulating levels with allusions to typical comments individuals in
different roles make in organisations: “System 4 is where they spend the money
we make in System 3!” – illustrating the typical tension between Research and
Development activities (System 4) and operational management (system 3). In
other words, the regulating levels represent different communities of people in
an organisation with different sets of expectations. Identifying a particular
function as System 3 or System 4 is to articulate a particular expectation.
Moreover, different sets of expectations are established in constradistinction
to one another. Once again, the statement that “System 4 is where they spend
the money we make in System 3” is a distinguishing of System 4 as something
“other” to the expectations of System 3.
In Johnson and Liber’s paper on the PLE, the regulating systems
of the VSM were presented as relating to the different activities of learning:
System 2’s ‘anti-oscilation’ was the timetable, System 3’s operational
management concerned the things that needed to be managed, System 4’s
activities concerned looking at future career and Personal Development
Planning, and System 5 concerned deeper questions about ‘what if…?’
The narrative of the VSM’s regulating levels is characterised by a
particular kind of language which codifies different expectations. Beer’s
identification of regulating mechanisms is a process of capturing these levels
of codification. He captured some of these everyday utterances about
organisation in his book “The Heart of Enterprise”, which between the
theoretical chapters on the VSM, he includes a section “Later at the bar…”
where a group of imaginary participants at a conference presentation discuss
the theory of what they’ve been told. Statements relating to the different
regulating mechanisms fall into different categories: “We have to make sure
that everyone does this”, “we need to think about how we should adapt”. Each statement can be thought of as a speech
act or a transaction in the course of managing both personal viability and the
viability of the organisation. From the individual’s perspective, the demand is
to make utterances which contribute to a situation in their environment which
they can survive better, and help with the process of being able to manage and
coordinate the complexity of all the other things they have to manage. Many of
these transactions are hidden, and yet the form of utterances reveals something
of the nature of constraint which bears upon the individual as they engage with
their environment. For example, if utterances are one-dimensional with little
variation irrespective of the conditions, then some aspect of constraint is
bearing upon them that causes this to occur; if utterances are varied and
well-targeted, then an individual is likely to be operating with greater
freedom to think.
Learning, Viability and Constraint
The advantage of discussing
viability rather than learning is that viability is relational: a learner is
viable in relation to an environment.
Viable means that the way the learner organises themselves balances the complexities
of the environment they are in – either through careful selection of those
aspects of information which they know they have to concern themselves with (what
Beer calls attenuation), or through expanding their capacity to organise themselves
in richer ways through technologies (amplification). A further advantage of
viability is that online discourse provides clues as to how individuals
organise themselves and the constraints within which they operate. Any discussion
about learning, by contrast, remains metaphysical speculation – and its
reification (which has been a characteristic of some discussion about the PLE) can
be a recipe for dogmatic ideology rather than intellectual inquiry.
A technical way of
examining viability and the nature of amplification and attenuation is to see
it as autonomous self-organisation within constraints. Constraint is the
flip-side of variety: the behaviours of viable systems adopt patterns –
repetitions, common tricks and habits – in response to constraints. The greater
the constraint, the more predictable the behaviour; the less constraint, the more erratic the behaviour. Each human being operates within multiple constraints
that may be identified individually, but whose net result is not reducible to
the action of any single one. We are constrained by bodies, emotions, the
emergent effects of childhood attachments, economic conditions, social class, educational
opportunity, jobs, family, transport, nutrition, access to healthcare, and so
on. Educational processes manipulate constraints. Whether it is the fear of a
five-year-old child in ascending a climbing frame, or the confidence to speak a
foreign language or play a musical instrument, what once constrained behaviour
within a particular range is overcome and behaviour acquires a broader range of
possibilities.
The cybernetic concept of
constraint has a more technical representation within Shannon’s Information
Theory. The variety of learner behaviour can be considered in terms of the average
surprisingness of different behaviours at any point in time. The inverse of
average surprisingness is called ‘redundancy’ or ‘constraint’. Shannon’s
information theory provides two equations which are powerful in describing
this. On the one hand, the average surprisingness of behaviour, identified by
Shannon as ‘H’, is:
In other words, the sum of
the log of probabilities of each event (i.e. each probability multiplied by
each other) weighted by the number of each type of event. (The minus sign results from the fact that probabilities are fractions, and therefore negative logarithms)
As the inverse of this
relation, the constraint, or redundancy (R) bearing upon the pattern of n
behaviours is 1 – H. H, however, is a scalar value potentially greater than 1 which needs to be expressed
as a value between 0 and 1. To do this, it is divided by a notional value for
the maximum possible surprise within the system, or Hmax:
These equations provide two
important aspects on learning which resonate with the Viable System Model. On
the one hand, learning can occur through increased self-organisation. In other
words, the observed surprisingness of learned behaviour may decrease to the
point where behaviour is reliable and predictable. H tends to 0 and constraint is 1. Such an increase in self-organisation might arise through
continued practice and mastery of skills such as the mastery of musical
performance, or mastery of language skills, for example.
Equally, however, something
may occur within either the learner or the environment which increases the possible
maximum surprisingness of events within an environment. This may be a new technology,
a performance-enhancing drug, or some acquired expansion of capability. Under
such conditions, constraints will also be increased as new possibilities
are reckoned with and there is greater self-organisation.
These information theoretic notions of learning are not speculations
about metaphysical processes. They are instead statements about the nature of
self-organisation within a complex environment. Having developed this
theoretical apparatus, we can turn to a concrete example of learners having to
coordinate their behaviour across different environments. On an online
Continuing Professional Development course, the variation in transactions is
reflected in different kinds of speech act that learners make in different
circumstances. We can speculate on the relationship between the variety of
speech acts in online transactions and the maintenance of individual viability for
learners on the course. Fundamentally, it is possible to consider ways in which
the constraints learners operate within are made apparent through discourse,
and then to consider the ways learners find of overcoming their constraints.